在一项重大裁定中，挪威最高法院撤销上诉法院的判决，该判决认为挪威法院依据《卢加诺公约》对新加坡海峡发生的船舶碰撞所涉及的直接诉讼享有管辖权。

该诉讼因“Stolt Commitment轮"”与“Thorco Cloud轮”于2015年12月16日在新加坡海峡印尼领海发生碰撞所引起。随后，“Thorco Cloud轮”的所有权人和光船承租人在挪威对“Stolt Commitment轮”的P&I保险公司Assuranceforeningen Gard提起诉讼，并请求追加“Stolt Commitment轮”的所有权人和光船承租人参与诉讼。

因两轮均非挪威的公司所有或承租，将争议与挪威联系起来的唯一因素是P&I保险公司的住所地。最高法院面临的问题是，该因素是否足以建立直接诉讼的管辖权，若可以，对于与挪威无关的向Stolt公司提起的索赔，该直接诉讼是否可以作为行使管辖权的依据。

显然，Thorco公司的目标在于从比荷兰额度更高的挪威全球责任限制中获取利益，而荷兰是Stolt公司的住所地。也就是说，该诉讼属于典型的选择诉讼地（forum shopping）诉讼。

最高法院判决

最高法院的五位法官中有四位根据《卢加诺公约》第2条第1款认为上诉法院对该直接诉讼享有管辖权是错误的，该公约规定：作为主要规则，被告应在其住所地的法院被起诉。这四位法官认为，与保险有关的问题由《卢加诺公约》第3章的管辖规则专门规定。因此第1章第2条第1款中的主要规则不能适用。这些法官得出结论认为管辖权由第11条第2款专门规定，该条款是第3章中有关直接诉讼的管辖条款。

根据第11条第2款，管辖权要求直接诉讼须被适用的国内法所允许。因此，选择法律必须依据挪威的法律选择规则。

三名法官认为上诉法院在根据第11条第2款考虑法律选择时存在错误。上诉法院将《挪威保险合同法》第7章第6条第5款作为法律选择的规则是错误的。这三名法官认为，考虑能否根据不同的法律支持判决的结论并撤销上诉法院的判决，已经超出最高法院的权限。这些法官认为，上诉法院在进一步考虑法律选择时，必须考虑到法律选择是否符合另一条牢固的规则或Irma-Mignon规则（最密切联系标准）。法官还认为在两种情况中，立法者在《保险合同法》准备工作中阐述的构想应予以着重考虑。

四名法官没有对Stolt公司的管辖权进行考虑，因为这取决于根据第11条第2款规定的对直接诉讼的管辖权。

值得注意的是，两名法官认为，如果适用挪威法，根据第11条第2款法院享有管辖权须满足，被保险人已经破产。因为P&I规则中的先付条款（pay-to-be-paid clause）不允许根据挪威法直接诉讼，除非被保险人破产。他们认为，根据第11条第2款，《保险合同法》第7章第8条第2款中对破产的要求由实质要求变为管辖权要求。

一名法官认为，如果根据第11条第2款对直接诉讼享有管辖权，被保险人作为共同诉讼人的相关依据是第11条第3款。该法官进一步指出，第11条第3款为共同诉讼提供基础，如果《保险合同法》第7章第6条第3款允许此种诉讼，该条仅授予被诉保险公司共同诉讼的权利，而未授予第三方申请人。

评 论

该判决向欧洲各地的责任保险公司作出了受欢迎的澄清，即明确《卢加诺公约》第3章是约束有关保险问题的独立且专有条款，除非第3章有特别规定，否则不得适用第1章的一般条款或第2章的特别条款。

因此，第三方申请人不能根据第2条第1款提出直接诉讼，而只能依据第11条第2款建立管辖权。

根据第11条第2款适用的法律选择规则尚未最终确定。然而，如果适用挪威法，被保险人破产很可能作为根据第11条第2款提出直接诉讼的管辖权要求。

第三方申请人在直接诉讼中追加被保险人的权利也没有最终确定，但如果适用挪威法，根据第11条第3款似乎不具有此种权利。

【英文原文】

Norwegian Supreme Court strikes a blow against forum shopping in direct action

By Herman Steen

In a landmark decision,[1] the Norwegian Supreme Court has set aside a decision from the Court of Appeal which had concluded that Norwegian courts have jurisdiction under the Lugano Convention in a direct action concerning a ship collision in the Singapore Strait.

The proceedings arose out of a collision between the "Stolt Commitment" and the "Thorco Cloud" in Indonesian territorial waters in the Singapore Strait on 16 December 2015. Following the collision, the owners and bareboat charterers of the "Thorco Cloud" brought a direct action in Norway against the P&I insurers of the "Stolt Commitment", Assuranceforeningen Gard, and sought to join the owners and bareboat charterers of the "Stolt Commitment" in the direct action.

As both vessels were owned and bareboat chartered by non-Norwegian companies, the only factor connecting the dispute to Norway was the domicile of the P&I insurers. The question brought to the Supreme Court was whether this was sufficient nexus to establish jurisdiction for the direct action and, if so, whether the direct action could act as an anchor providing jurisdiction for the claims against the Stolt companies which had no connection to Norway.

It was clear that the Thorco companies' objective was to benefit from the higher global limitation of liability limits in Norway compared to the limits in the Netherlands, where the Stolt companies are domiciled. In other words, the proceedings were classic ''forum shopping''.

Supreme Court Decision

A majority of four (out of five) judges in the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal was wrong in establishing jurisdiction for the direct action on the basis of the Lugano Convention Article 2 No. 1 (which provides that a defendant shall as a main rule be sued in the courts of its domicile). The majority's reasoning was that matters related to insurance are exclusively governed by the jurisdiction rules in the Lugano Convention Section 3. The main rule in Article 2 No. 1, which is found in Section 1, could therefore not be applied. The majority concluded that jurisdiction is exclusively governed by Article 11 No. 2, which is the jurisdiction provision in Section 3 for direct actions.

It is a requirement for jurisdiction under Article 11 No. 2 that direct action is "permitted" pursuant to the applicable national law. A choice of law must therefore be made pursuant to Norwegian choice of law rules.

A majority of three judges found that the Court of Appeal erred in law when considering the choice of law under Article 11 No. 2. The Court of Appeal was wrong in holding that the Norwegian Insurance Contract Act section 7-6 (5) is a choice of law rule. The majority found that it was outside the Supreme Court's competency to consider whether the decision could be upheld on a different legal basis, and set aside the Court of Appeal's decision. The majority commented that when the Court of Appeal considers the choice of law further, it must consider whether the choice of law follows from another firm rule or alternatively from the Irma-Mignon-formulae (test of closest connection). The majority stated that in both instances the legislator's assumptions as expressed in the preparatory works to the Insurance Contract Act should be given considerable weight.

A majority of four judges did not consider jurisdiction against the Stolt companies since this depends on there being jurisdiction for the direct action under Article 11 No. 2.

It is worth noting that a minority of two judges found that, assuming Norwegian law applies, it is a requirement under Article 11 No. 2 for the court to have jurisdiction that the assured is insolvent. This is because the pay-to-be-paid clause in the P&I Rules prevents direct action under Norwegian law unless the assured is insolvent. The minority found that, under Article 11 No. 2, the requirement of insolvency in the Insurance Contract Act section 7-8 (2) is transformed from a substantive requirement to a requirement for jurisdiction.

A minority of one judge found that, if there was jurisdiction for the direct action under Article 11 No. 2, the relevant basis for a joinder of an assured would be Article 11 No. 3. He further commented that Article 11 No. 3 provides the basis for a joinder if this is permitted under the Insurance Contract Act section 7-6 (3), which only grants a right of joinder to the insurer which is sued in the direct action, and not to the third party claimant.

Comment

The decision provides welcome clarification to liability insurers across Europe, clearly determining that Section 3 of the Lugano Convention is a self-contained and exclusive code governing matters related to insurance, allowing no recourse to the general rules in Section 1 or the special rules in Section 2 unless specifically provided in Section 3.

Thus, third party claimants cannot rely on Article 2 No. 1 in a direct action, and can only establish jurisdiction on the basis of Article 11 No. 2.

The choice of law rules to be applied under Article 11 No. 2 have not been finally determined. However, assuming that Norwegian law applies, the assured's insolvency is likely to be a requirement for jurisdiction for a direct action pursuant to Article 11 No. 2.

The third party claimant's right to join an assured in the direct action has also not been finally determined, but assuming that Norwegian law applies it seems likely that there will be no such right pursuant to Article 11 No. 3.

Wikborg Rein[1] is assisting Gard and the Stolt companies in this matter.

[1] HR-2018-869-A. [2] Herman Steen and Kaare A. Shetelig appeared before the Supreme Court.

来源： 临时仲裁ADA，不代表本会意见